Enterprise Authentication Surfaces
AxonFlow Enterprise uses more than one authentication model because the platform exposes more than one kind of surface.
The most common source of confusion is assuming that all enterprise APIs use the same header or credential pattern. They do not.
The Main Authentication Surfaces
1. Customer portal session authentication
This is the standard login flow for the customer portal and many portal-backed enterprise APIs.
Core endpoints:
POST /api/v1/auth/loginPOST /api/v1/auth/logoutGET /api/v1/auth/sessionGET /api/v1/auth/sso/availability
Successful login creates the axonflow_session cookie. Portal-backed APIs then use that session context. Current portal sessions use SameSite=Lax.
The login endpoint is rate-limited to 5 attempts per minute per IP address.
Password reset and change endpoints:
POST /api/v1/auth/forgot-passwordPOST /api/v1/auth/reset-passwordPOST /api/v1/auth/change-password
This is also the model used by the current SDK portal-login helpers.
2. SSO portal login (SAML and OIDC)
Enterprise portal login (plane a of the three identity planes) is tenant-aware and exposes provider-aware routes for both protocols.
SAML routes:
GET /auth/saml/{tenantID}/metadataGET /auth/saml/{tenantID}/loginPOST /auth/saml/{tenantID}/callback
OIDC routes (v9.16.0):
GET /auth/oidc/{tenantID}/loginGET /auth/oidc/{tenantID}/callback
The pre-login availability check (GET /api/v1/auth/sso/availability) returns the correct login URL for whichever protocol the tenant configured, so a client does not need to know the protocol in advance.
The customer portal also exposes SSO configuration endpoints once you are authenticated. Both SAML and OIDC portal-login providers are configured through the same /api/v1/sso/config surface. The SAML metadata-fetch and provider-default helpers are SAML-specific; OIDC providers are configured from their issuer, audience, JWKS URI, and client credentials. This is portal login only; per-user fleet OIDC tokens (X-User-Token) are a separate plane, covered in Per-Developer Identity.
3. Portal API keys
Portal API keys are managed through authenticated portal APIs and are useful for automation around the customer portal surface.
Key-management endpoints:
GET /api/v1/keysPOST /api/v1/keysGET /api/v1/keys/{keyID}DELETE /api/v1/keys/{keyID}
These are not the same thing as SCIM tokens or the public runtime's client credentials.
4. SCIM bearer-token authentication
SCIM provisioning is its own integration surface:
- base path:
/scim/v2 - guarded by SCIM-specific bearer-token auth
SCIM discovery endpoints exist within the same surface:
/scim/v2/ServiceProviderConfig/scim/v2/Schemas/scim/v2/ResourceTypes
And the core provisioning resources are:
/scim/v2/Users/scim/v2/Groups
Treat SCIM as a dedicated provisioning API, not as a generic extension of portal session auth.
Portal Login Flow
For standard customer-portal access:
- the user submits
org_idand password toPOST /api/v1/auth/login - the portal validates the organization and password
- the backend creates a session record
- the response sets the
axonflow_sessioncookie - authenticated portal APIs use the session context on subsequent requests
The portal also supports a session-check route:
GET /api/v1/auth/session
That is the easiest way to verify whether the portal session is still active.
Password Recovery
The portal login page has a "Forgot password?" link. What happens next depends on how the deployment is configured.
Self-service reset by email
When the deployment has an email backend configured, submitting an organization ID on the forgot-password page emails a reset link to the organization's contact email address:
- the user submits their
org_idon/forgot-password(POST /api/v1/auth/forgot-password) - the portal always answers with the same generic confirmation - it never reveals whether the organization exists
- if the organization exists and has a contact email, a reset link is sent to that address; the link expires after 1 hour (one active token per organization)
- the link opens
/reset-password, where the user chooses a new password (minimum 8 characters); the token is single-use - the user signs in with the new password
The forgot-password endpoint is rate-limited to 5 requests per minute per IP address, matching the login endpoint.
AXONFLOW_TRUST_PROXY_HOPSThe login and password-reset rate limits are counted per client address, which
the portal reads from the X-Forwarded-For header your ingress sets. By
default it trusts one proxy layer (an ALB, or a single nginx), which is
correct for most deployments.
If requests reach the portal through two or more trusted proxies - for
example Cloudflare in front of your own nginx - set
AXONFLOW_TRUST_PROXY_HOPS to the number of proxy layers. Otherwise every user
is counted as the same client, and five failed sign-ins from anyone in the
organization locks out everyone for a minute.
Set it to the real number of trusted proxies and no higher: a value larger than the number of proxies makes the limit count on a value the caller can choose, which defeats it. The resolved setting is printed in the portal's startup log so you can confirm it.
Independently of the per-IP limits, each organization has a re-issue cooldown: while an unused reset link issued in the last 5 minutes is still valid, a repeat request sends no second email and does not replace the outstanding link. This keeps a reset link that has already reached someone's inbox working, and stops a caller who knows an organization ID from using the endpoint to mail that organization repeatedly. Requesting again after the link is used, expires, or the window passes issues a fresh one and invalidates the previous.
The organization password is the documented always-works fallback when SSO is
misconfigured or the IdP is unavailable, so the reset flow is deliberately not
gated on enforce_sso.
Deployment configuration
Email delivery is configured on the customer-portal service. The portal supports two transports and activates exactly one.
| Transport | Configure with | Suits |
|---|---|---|
| SMTP relay | AXONFLOW_SMTP_HOST + AXONFLOW_SMTP_PORT | Self-hosted and in-VPC deployments. No third-party vendor, no sending-domain verification, and reset mail never leaves your own infrastructure. |
| Resend | RESEND_API_KEY | Deployments already using Resend, with a sending domain verified there (DKIM + SPF). |
If you run AxonFlow yourself, use SMTP. You almost certainly already operate a relay (Postfix, Exchange, an SES SMTP endpoint, your provider's submission host), and routing reset mail through it keeps the message inside your own network, which is usually the only answer a regulated deployment can give. Resend is an HTTPS service: using it means signing up with a third party and verifying a sending domain there.
Both transports need the same two shared settings, AXONFLOW_FROM_EMAIL and
AXONFLOW_PORTAL_BASE_URL, described below.
When RESEND_API_KEY is set, Resend is selected and the AXONFLOW_SMTP_*
settings are ignored entirely. The portal logs this explicitly at startup.
Unset RESEND_API_KEY to use the relay. On an AWS CloudFormation stack you
cannot even create the ambiguity: setting both ResendAPIKeySecretArn and
SMTPHost fails the stack operation. The selected transport is named in the
startup log, so you can confirm which one is live.
SMTP relay setup
# Required together. There is no default port: 587 and 465 need different
# transport security, so the portal will not guess one for you.
AXONFLOW_SMTP_HOST=smtp.internal.acme.example # bare hostname, no port
AXONFLOW_SMTP_PORT=587
# Required, shared with the Resend transport (see below).
AXONFLOW_FROM_EMAIL="Acme Portal <[email protected]>"
AXONFLOW_PORTAL_BASE_URL=https://portal.acme.example
# Optional. Set BOTH or NEITHER. Many internal relays need neither.
AXONFLOW_SMTP_USERNAME=portal
AXONFLOW_SMTP_PASSWORD=...
# Optional. starttls (default) | tls | none
AXONFLOW_SMTP_TLS=starttls
# Optional. PEM bundle for a relay whose certificate comes from your own CA.
AXONFLOW_SMTP_CA_FILE=/etc/axonflow/relay-ca.pem
Transport security.
starttlsis the default whenAXONFLOW_SMTP_TLSis unset: the connection opens in plaintext and is upgraded before AUTH or any message bytes. Typical port 587. If the relay does not advertise STARTTLS the send fails; it never continues unencrypted.tlsis implicit TLS from the first byte. Typical port 465.nonesends the session in the clear. It exists for an internal relay on a trusted network, it has to be typed (you cannot reach it by leaving the variable unset), and the portal refuses to start if you combine it withAXONFLOW_SMTP_USERNAME, because SMTP AUTH PLAIN is base64 encoding, not encryption. Choosing it logs a warning naming the relay.
There is deliberately no setting that disables certificate verification.
Certificates are verified against the hostname you configured in
AXONFLOW_SMTP_HOST.
If your relay presents a certificate from an internal CA, point
AXONFLOW_SMTP_CA_FILE at a PEM bundle for that CA. The value is a path
inside the container, so it needs a mounted file: that is available on the
Docker Compose and self-hosted install paths, and there is no CloudFormation
parameter equivalent. On a CloudFormation stack, use a relay whose certificate
chains to a public root.
Resend setup
RESEND_API_KEY=re_...
AXONFLOW_FROM_EMAIL="Acme Portal <[email protected]>"
AXONFLOW_PORTAL_BASE_URL=https://portal.acme.example
The sending domain must be verified in your Resend account.
The two shared settings
| Variable | Purpose |
|---|---|
AXONFLOW_FROM_EMAIL | The from-address, for example Acme Ops <[email protected]>. With SMTP, your relay must be willing to send as this address. AXONFLOW_RESET_FROM_EMAIL overrides it for reset mail specifically; either one satisfies the startup check. |
AXONFLOW_PORTAL_BASE_URL | The portal's external base URL, for example https://portal.acme.example. Every emailed reset link is built from it. Required in every deployment mode, including SaaS. |
Fail-closed behavior
Transport selection has exactly three outcomes, and "silently does nothing" is not one of them:
| Configuration | Result |
|---|---|
| No transport configured | POST /api/v1/auth/forgot-password returns 501, exactly as it did before this feature existed. Use the administrator fallback below. |
| A transport fully configured | Mail is sent. Startup logs which transport is live. |
| A transport partly configured | The portal refuses to build the sender, names the specific variable in the startup log, and the endpoint stays on 501. |
The third row is the one that matters. Setting AXONFLOW_SMTP_PORT and
forgetting AXONFLOW_SMTP_HOST, typing AXONFLOW_SMTP_TLS=tsl, giving a
username with no password, or writing the port into the host as
smtp.example.com:587 does not quietly fall back to "email disabled". Each
is a named error in the startup log. A silent 501 reads as "the feature was
never built"; a log line reads as "you set two of three variables".
The same applies to the two shared settings. A transport configured without
AXONFLOW_FROM_EMAIL, or without AXONFLOW_PORTAL_BASE_URL, is refused in
every deployment mode. Without a base URL, every emailed link would carry a
live reset token to the AxonFlow SaaS portal, a host you do not control. A
value that is only separators (/, //) or whitespace is not a usable base
URL and counts as unset.
The portal never claims a link was sent without sending one, and never mails a link pointing at a host the operator does not control.
SSO_BASE_URL is now AXONFLOW_PORTAL_BASE_URL
The portal's external base URL builds the emailed reset link and the SAML
ACS / OIDC redirect URLs. Naming it SSO_BASE_URL led deployments that use
password login and no SSO to skip it, after which reset mail either refused to
start or pointed at the wrong host.
AXONFLOW_PORTAL_BASE_URL is the name to use. SSO_BASE_URL keeps working as
a deprecated alias, read only when the new name is unset or empty, and logged
once at startup so you know to rename it. If both are set, the new name wins.
Nothing breaks on upgrade: a deployment that sets only SSO_BASE_URL behaves
exactly as before, and the CloudFormation template renders both names from the
single PortalExternalBaseURL parameter. An unusable value under one name
never shadows a working value under the other: the two names are normalized
before precedence is decided, so AXONFLOW_PORTAL_BASE_URL=/ alongside a real
SSO_BASE_URL resolves to the real one.
CloudFormation parameters
On AWS deployments the CloudFormation template exposes these parameters for the customer-portal task. All default to empty, so a stack that sets none of them renders exactly the task definition it rendered before.
| Parameter | Maps to |
|---|---|
SMTPHost, SMTPPort | AXONFLOW_SMTP_HOST, AXONFLOW_SMTP_PORT |
SMTPUsername, SMTPPasswordSecretArn | AXONFLOW_SMTP_USERNAME, AXONFLOW_SMTP_PASSWORD (the password by Secrets Manager ARN) |
SMTPTLSMode | AXONFLOW_SMTP_TLS |
ResendAPIKeySecretArn | RESEND_API_KEY (by Secrets Manager ARN) |
FromEmailAddress | AXONFLOW_FROM_EMAIL |
PortalExternalBaseURL | AXONFLOW_PORTAL_BASE_URL (and the deprecated SSO_BASE_URL, from the same parameter) |
TrustedProxyHops | AXONFLOW_TRUST_PROXY_HOPS |
The template enforces the same completeness rules the portal does, at stack
time rather than at boot: SMTPPort is required with SMTPHost,
SMTPPasswordSecretArn is required with SMTPUsername, FromEmailAddress and
PortalExternalBaseURL are required with either transport, and setting both
transports is rejected outright.
On a local development machine with no email backend, the endpoint returns the
reset token in the response body as a testing convenience. That branch is
limited to ENVIRONMENT unset, development, dev or local. Every
deployed environment - including staging - answers 501 instead, because
echoing a live password-changing token to an unauthenticated caller would be
a disclosure channel.
Deployments without an email backend
Self-hosted (in-VPC) deployments that have not configured email keep the
previous behavior: POST /api/v1/auth/forgot-password returns
501 Not Implemented, and the forgot-password page shows an honest
"password reset by email is not configured for this deployment" notice
instead of a fake confirmation.
Operators can always reset an organization's portal password directly with
POST /api/v1/admin/organizations/{org_id}/password (authenticated with
X-Admin-API-Key), regardless of email configuration. Self-hosted install
bundles also ship ./reset-portal-credential.sh for the deployment org.
SSO configuration (SAML and OIDC)
Enterprise customers can configure portal SSO per tenant, using SAML or OIDC.
Useful portal-authenticated SSO configuration endpoints include:
GET /api/v1/sso/configPOST /api/v1/sso/configPUT /api/v1/sso/configPATCH /api/v1/sso/configDELETE /api/v1/sso/configPOST /api/v1/sso/config/testGET /api/v1/sso/auditGET /api/v1/sso/providersGET /api/v1/sso/providers/defaultsGET /api/v1/sso/sp-metadataPOST /api/v1/sso/fetch-metadata
The pre-login availability check is:
GET /api/v1/auth/sso/availability?org_id=YOUR_ORG_ID
This lets a portal client decide whether to present password auth, SSO, or both.
SCIM Token Management
SCIM token management is handled from the authenticated portal side, while the SCIM provisioning requests themselves use SCIM bearer-token auth.
Token-management endpoints:
GET /api/v1/scim/tokensPOST /api/v1/scim/tokensDELETE /api/v1/scim/tokens/{tokenID}
This separation is worth understanding operationally:
- portal admins create and manage SCIM tokens through the authenticated portal
- the identity provider uses those tokens against
/scim/v2/...
Admin Organization APIs
The organization-admin APIs are a separate admin surface under:
/api/v1/admin
These routes are guarded by admin-specific middleware rather than the ordinary customer-portal session model.
Examples include:
GET/POST /api/v1/admin/organizationsGET/PATCH/DELETE /api/v1/admin/organizations/{org_id}POST /api/v1/admin/organizations/{org_id}/passwordGET/POST/DELETE /api/v1/admin/organizations/{org_id}/license
This is one of the clearest examples of why "all enterprise APIs use the same auth" is the wrong mental model.
SDK Portal Authentication
The current SDKs support portal login helpers that target the standard login endpoint and store the session cookie client-side.
The underlying behavior is aligned across SDKs:
- login via
POST /api/v1/auth/login - store the session cookie
- use that cookie for portal-backed requests
- clear it on logout
That means SDK-driven portal operations are using the same real authentication model as browser portal usage, not a separate fake or simplified API.
When to Use Which Authentication Method
| Use case | Recommended auth model |
|---|---|
| human user using the portal | session auth |
| browser-based enterprise UI workflows | session auth |
| organization portal SSO rollout | SAML or OIDC portal login plus session auth |
| per-user identity on a tool's governed API calls | X-User-Token OIDC token (fleet identity) |
| automated portal administration | portal API keys where appropriate |
| identity provisioning from Okta, Microsoft Entra ID, OneLogin, or another SCIM IdP | SCIM bearer tokens |
| admin org lifecycle operations | admin-gated /api/v1/admin APIs |
Common Mistakes
- treating SCIM as if it used the same auth model as the portal
- assuming all enterprise endpoints accept the same org headers or bearer token
- forgetting that portal login establishes a cookie-backed session
- debugging SSO failures as if they were password-login failures
- using portal API keys where a SCIM token is actually required